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Following Greece’s failure to make a scheduled debt repayment to the IMF on 30 June the country
now stands on the brink of exiting the euro. Sony Kapoor writes that while the Greek government
could be accused of naivety in the manner it has conducted negotiations, the root cause of the crisis
has been the unwillingness of Greece’s creditors to rectify previous mistakes by providing further
debt relief to the country. He argues that unless creditors alter their approach over the next few
days, the consequences could be severe for both Greece and the Eurozone.
Despite having experienced an angry German government almost push Greece out of the Eurozone
in 2012 at ﬁrst hand, I never thought we would be standing at this crossroads again. It took many of us – advisers,
EU technocrats, American politicians and some academics – several weeks to convince the key-decision makers in
Berlin not to pull the trigger, and it was far from obvious we would be successful. In the end Chancellor Merkel took
a fateful decision to overrule the ﬁnance minister Wolfgang Schäuble, who remained unconvinced.
Living through this process was hell not least because economic arguments, ﬁnancial calculations and political
scenarios are not ideal for changing the minds of often-ideological lawyers that form the core of the German ﬁnancial
policymaking community. For them it was less about the economics and more about rules and morality.
To be fair to them, when Greece ﬁrst announced in late 2009 that it had been understating its deﬁcit ﬁgures for
years, German policymakers were amongst the ﬁrst to seriously countenance debt restructuring for Greece.
However, word from Trichet at the ECB as well as active lobbying by large German and French banks convinced
them otherwise. They were told that restructuring Greek debt would trigger a major ﬁnancial crisis through losses
that the banking system could not aﬀord to bear and through potential contagion to other Eurozone sovereign bond
markets.
Hence that fateful decision not to restructure Greek debt was taken, the best opportunity to oﬀer Greece a fresh start
was missed. To be fair to the rest of the Eurozone, the Greek government was also strongly against a restructuring
of its own debt, seeing it as a humiliation. But the banks needed to be repaid, Greece needed money to survive and
a bailout needed to be arranged in a hurry. This was the original sin. Conceived in a hurry, the bailout was deeply
ﬂawed at many diﬀerent levels.
The initial ﬁnancial terms oﬀered to Greece were rather onerous, the conditions attached far too prescriptive and the
pace of ﬁscal adjustment too much, as the IMF badly underestimated the impact of austerity on the economy. It has
been estimated that of the money lent to Greece more than three-quarters went into paying oﬀ existing creditors and
less than 10 per cent in supporting citizens through the shock adjustment. In eﬀect, most of the Greek bailout funds
were used to bail out Eurozone banks and other creditors.
The ECB, and Greece’s central bank was part of a cumbersome ‘Troika’ arrangement that dictated policy to Greece,
when central banks are typically at the receiving end of IMF conditionality. Decisions by the three institutions were
taken on the basis of a “least common denominator” and thus many were ill conceived and no Greek government
ever really bought into the onerous conditionality. Our suggestion that Greece needed a World Bank programme to
facilitate state building was summarily dismissed both by Greeks and the Eurozone, which hubristically thought it
humiliating.
By 2012, Greek GDP had predictably collapsed, domestic politics was upended, unemployment reached record
levels and the IMF could no longer pretend to believe in its own models, thus a new deal was needed. Here again
our recommendation for a deep face value haircut for external private creditors, easing the terms of the public
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bailout and leaving Greek banks and pension funds out of the restructuring were countered by proposals from BNP
Paribas and other banks that argued face value haircuts were not necessary. In the end, after an ineﬃcient two-step
process, Greece did get a signiﬁcant reduction in the face value of its debt but it was far too little and too late. Much
of the private debt had already been replaced by public debt that could not be haircut.
With that second opportunity missed, Greece’s descent into a great depression continued until more than 25 per
cent of GDP was lost and youth unemployment reached 60 per cent: driven, in no small measure, by record levels of
austerity. Greek citizens, fed-up after ﬁve years of public humiliation and economic suﬀering, rooted for the anti-
establishment anti-austerity Syriza in the 2015 elections. As the only party that had not been part of Greece’s
clientelist state, Syriza oﬀered to take on the oligarchs domestically and negotiate a new deal with the Eurozone
internationally.
But Greece’s answer to Obama’s “Hope and Change” never stood a chance. With no previous experience of
government and ill versed in what passes for diplomacy in the EU, Syriza overplayed what was essentially a very
weak hand. The day after Syriza was voted in, senior German politicians said “Greeks had voted for a Grexit” and
few Eurozone governments were ready to negotiate in good faith.
The good-will towards Greece resulting from the guilt staﬀers at the IMF and the European Commission felt about
their own signiﬁcant role in Greece’s tragedy was also slowly eroded by the sharp elbows the Greeks brought to the
table. Trust was eroded on all sides and it became impossible to triangulate between what the Greeks were willing to
accept on the one hand and what the IMF and the Eurozone were planning to concede on the other. Disagreements
between the Eurozone and the IMF were at least as big as those between Greece and its Eurozone partners.
On pure economics, Syriza got it mostly right both in terms of the diagnoses of the crisis and on what micro and
macro level steps were needed to restore the Greek economy. But its big mistake was to assume that economic
arguments could prevail over ideology and realpolitik. Another was its failure to convince its Eurozone counterparts
that it would actually deliver on the promises it made. While Syriza could be excused for its naivety, its creditors get
no such free pass. Their unwillingness to admit mistakes, keep promises for further debt relief and focus on petty
parochial politics has once again trampled upon Greek democracy and sensible economic policy, and caused great
harm to the European Project.
Unless they are willing to give Greece a fair chance over the next few days, the damage will be irreparable. And it is
not just Greeks who will have to live with the consequences.
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